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Abstract
This paper studies patenting decisions by rms in relation to the negotiation and
signing of the Helsinki and Oslo protocol as part of the Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution. We use a uniquely constructed patent data set on SO2
abatement technologies led in 15 signatory and non-signatory countries in the pe-
riod 1970-1997. The data distinguish between so-called motherpatents, or original
inventions, and familypatents, which represent the same invention but are patents
led in foreign countries. Our analysis suggests that not only local environmental
regulations matter for patenting decisions. International environmental agreements
provide incentives for additional inventive activity in and the di¤usion of knowledge
towards signatory countries by reducing investment uncertainty for inventing rms.
Keywords: International environmental agreements, Inventions, Knowledge trans-
fers, Patents, Acid rain
JEL Codes: D7; D8; O31; Q5
1 Introduction
This paper o¤ers a new perspective on the currently dominant view that interna-
tional environmental agreements (IEAs), such as the Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), have only little or even no impact on lo-
cal e¤orts to reduce international environmental spillovers. Recent empirical and
anecdotal evidence suggests that the LTRAP convention, which aims at reducing
emissions in sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOX), has added little to
what local governments were already planning to do (e.g., Levy, 1993; Murdoch and
Sandler, 1997ab; Murdoch et al., 2003; Finus and Tjøtta, 2003). Even though IEAs
in general may not be indicative for inducing emission reductions directly, we present
evidence that the sulfur protocols under LRTAP have played a role on their own,
albeit indirectly, by stimulating new inventions and their di¤usion. Using a unique
international patent data set, we show that the 1985 Helsinki protocol and the 1994
Oslo protocol changed the expectations of inventing rms in SO2 abatement tech-
nologies about their market conditions, and therefore inuenced both their inventive
activity and their patent protection strategy.
We consider inventing rmsdecisions about what to protect and where to
protect. The what to protectdecision relates to the protection of new knowledge
becoming available from inventing activities.1 The where to protectdecision re-
gards the decision in which other countries (besides the inventors own country) the
invention is worth to be protected. Both decisions are disentangled empirically by
distinguishing between so called motherand familypatents of the same piece of
new knowledge (e.g., Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004).
Using this distinction, we study the responsiveness of patenting behavior of invent-
ing rms in SO2 abatement technologies for signals such as those provided by IEAs,
in particular the LRTAP convention as codied in the Helsinki and Oslo protocols
signed in 1985 and 1994 respectively. An IEA is considered to provide a signal to
inventors that a¤ects their market expectations and, in turn, invention protection
decisions. This signal is twofold. First, negotiations on the IEA signal that new,
potentially more stringent regulations are likely to be introduced in the countries
that participate in the IEA soon. We call this the run-up e¤ect. Second, an IEA
creates a more lasting signal, or permanent e¤ect, if the agreement would guarantee
a persistent demand for new inventions, i.e., provides an opportunity for inventing
rms to sell their new inventions in the future. With such an IEA one would expect
1We dene new knowledgeas original or modied inventions. Patents typically seek to protect
such knowledge.
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the demand for technologies to be persistently higher in signatory countries than in
non-signatories after the signing of the protocol.
Our analysis is based on an innovative construction of a patent data set on SO2
abatement technologies for 15 countries in the period 1970-1997. Several of these 15
countries did not cooperate under LRTAP. The period we study covers the phase-in
period of LRTAP coordination for which the Helsinki and Oslo protocols are land-
marks. We nd clear indications that these protocols have indeed a¤ected patenting
behavior of inventing rms. In contrast to Popp (2006), we nd indications that
rms take the protocolssignaling e¤ects into account. For instance, the Helsinki
protocol stimulated German rms to continue their inventive activity even after its
own national policy became e¤ective. The protocol negotiations allowed German
inventors to reap the potential benets of their position as a technology leader at
the time of the actual signing of the protocol. Knowledge di¤usion decisions are also
responsive to the establishment of the IEA to reduce SO2-emissions. Family patents
become more directed towards signatory countries both in the run-up period and
after the establishment of a coalition. This nding is also robust to the observation
that the value of mother patents (measured by the number of families for a given
mother patent) increases after the negotiations started on the Helsinki protocol.
The next section provides a background analysis of our case study. Section
3 describes the local and international regulation of SO2 emissions and our data
collection procedure. Section 4 presents a rst look at the (distribution of) patent
counts. Section 5 describes the econometric model and section 6 presents the results
for our main hypothesis. Section 7 examines endogeneity and identication problems
as well as discusses some robustness issues. Section 8 concludes.
2 Inventions, knowledge ows and IEAs
Recent empirical evidence conrms the old Hicksian idea that inventions are trig-
gered by changes in the relative prices of the factors of production (Hicks, 1932;
Acemoglu, 2001). For example, Popp (2002) provides evidence that rising oil and
gas prices induce patents for fossil-fuel saving technologies. Technology groups such
as fuel cells, use of waste as fuel or for heat production, and coal gasication have
clearly benetted from the rise in fossil fuel energy prices over time. Similarly, envi-
ronmental policy  whether implemented through a standard or a tax enhances
technological change because a policy program signals to (new) producers that it is
benecial to engage in R&D directed at meeting the requirements of the standard or
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at reducing tax payments. This is precisely what Popp (2006) found for the linkage
between (local) emission standards for NOX and SO2 and patent counts of air pollu-
tion control equipment. In addition, Popp reports that rms in the most important
inventing countries in these technological elds (the U.S., Germany and Japan) es-
sentially responded to environmental regulatory pressure in their own country, but
not to foreign environmental regulations.
Decisions to invest in new knowledge on abatement technologies and its (local
and international) protection by patents are likely to be a¤ected by actual local
regulations (see Popp, 2006). We believe that rms expectations about future
local regulations are relevant too. Moreover, we expect that a well-designed IEA
creates a signal to inventing rms about this development. Negotiations on (or
the signing of) such an IEA (e.g., the Helsinki protocol), including changes of its
existing rulings (e.g., the Oslo protocol), are likely to provide a (public) signal
to inventing rms about opportunities for the protable exploitation of their new
or existing technologies. Not only will rms consider these new opportunities in
their own country, but also in other countries, particularly in those countries that
are participating in the negotiations and are therefore likely to become a signatory.
Hence, our hypothesis is that IEAs induce more inventions in and direct the di¤usion
of these technologies towards the participating countries.2
The what to protectdecision is a decision on the protection of new knowledge
generated by the rm and is embodied in the so-called mother patent, which is the
original patent. Mother patents are usually led in the home country of the inven-
tor (or inventing rm). The inventing rm will also screen the option to protect its
invention in other countries. Indeed, inventors can also le exactly the same patent
in other countries up to one year after the ling of the mother patent. Patent ap-
plications designated to other countries are therefore referred to as family members
of the mother patent. An inventor is likely to create a family of his nationally pro-
tected (mother) invention in other countries if the potential gains of protection in
foreign markets are believed to outweigh its investment costs (Eaton et al., 2004).3
The more countries in which a rm seeks to protect its new knowledge, the larger
the (international) size of this market and the expected value of this new knowledge.
Thus, family patents allow us to separate the decision of rms about what to pro-
2Note that the market size of a typical local invention in abatement technology is not restricted
to the home country, but also depends on other countries introducing similar stringent emission
restrictions as well (see also Acemoglu et al., 2009).
3Only Lanjouw and Mody (1996) and Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) exploit the distinction
between mother and family patents. The rst paper illustrates that they indeed play an important
role in the di¤usion of abatement technologies to developing countries.
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tectfrom the one where to protect. By distinguishing mother and family patents
we are able to study not only whether the number or location of original inventions
correlates with regulatory signals like local regulation or the signing of an IEA, but
also whether the number and designation of the families of a given invention is sen-
sitive to such events. Patent families can be characterized as intended knowledge
ows, in contrast to patent citations, which are not made by the original inventor
but by another inventor who builds on the original invention. Patent citations can
be helpful when it comes to studying the international di¤usion of knowledge (see
Ja¤e and Trajtenberg, 2002; Keller, 2004; Popp, 2006). However, patent citations
are not instrumental to answer the questions that we wish to address.
Our hypothesis is that both the number of mother and family patents increases
in the participating countries. One would expect such an e¤ect before the actual
signing of the introduction of an IEA. More specically, we expect a run-up e¤ect
of IEAs on new inventions because IEA negotiations shift expectations ex-ante and
provide an excellent opportunity for rms to inuence market conditions in their
own favor. In addition, the IEA could induce a stream of inventions as long as it
provides a credible signal that demand for new inventions will continue to exist, i.e.,
provides an opportunity for inventing rms within signatory countries to sell its new
inventions on a more permanent basis. Also the where to protectdecision is likely
to be a¤ected. We expect the IEA to inuence the direction of family patenting
behavior such that more family patents are likely to be observed in participating
countries. As with mother patents, depending on the design and credibility of the
IEA, we may also expect a more permanent increase in led family patents in the
participating countries. Finally, we expect the value of a given invention to rise
 through a larger family size due to the existence of an IEA.4
The patent data set we collected allows us to explore these potential e¤ects of
IEAs on the protection of new technologies and their designation by comparing
di¤erences in mother and family patent ling behavior of rms in both signatory
and non-signatory countries in the years preceding as well as after the signing of the
protocols.
4Note that family size is indeed as indicative of the value of a specic patent as patent citations
(see Harho¤ et al., 2003, p.1358). The mere existence of family members for a given patent as a
measure of value has also been recognized by the use of so-called claimed priorities (see, for instance,
Popp, 2006), which are patents that are claimed in at least one other country. Such patents would
be more valuable than those that are protected in one country. However, this approach does not
exploit the information contained in the number and designation of the patents.
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3 SO2 regulation and patent data
This section rst discusses developments in both national and international regula-
tion of SO2 emissions and then explains our patent counts in detail.
3.1 Regulation of SO2 emissions
Regulation of SO2 emissions dates back to the late 1960s and early 1970s. At that
time Japan and the U.S. took the lead with their implementation of regulatory
schemes for coal-red power plants. Already in 1968 Japan set emission standards
that varied from plant to plant and the U.S. imposed a rst limit on emissions in the
Clean Air Act (CAA) in 1970. It took another decade before international coopera-
tion was established under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe (UNECE). Individual interests of countries in cooperation may di¤er con-
siderably due to large di¤erences in the balance between imports and exports of acid
emissions. Particularly Scandinavian countries and Canada su¤ered severely from
acid rain in the late seventies, because their soils lack limestone. Hence, they were
especially vulnerable to acid deposition (Barrett, 2003, p.7¤). Because acid rain
crosses borders, a complex relationship exists between polluters and victims. Not
only the prevailing western wind produced acid deposits in vulnerable areas, but
sulfur imports also found their origin in Eastern European states.
The rst international treaty was the Convention on LRTAP in 1979 (see Sec-
tion 1). It provided the framework under which several protocols were established
to regulate specic pollutants, starting with the reduction of sulfur oxides. At this
time there was political reluctance to immediately enter into binding commitments
to reduce emissions. With growing awareness of the seriousness of acid depositions
in the early 1980s in Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and particularly Ger-
many, the political tide turned, leading to the Helsinki protocol  signed in 1985
and entered into force in 1987 on the reduction of sulfur emissions or their trans-
boundary uxes (Sliggers and Kakebeeke, 2004). For all signatories the reduction
target for SO2 emissions was 30% by 1994 compared to 1980 levels. The next major
event that explicitly aimed to further reduce sulfur emissions has been its follow
up protocol in Oslo in 1994. This Oslo Protocol on Further Reductions of Sul-
fur Emissionsintroduced a di¤erentiation of emission reduction targets (base year
1980) due to increased knowledge of the complexity of the international emission-
deposition-damage chain as well as the aim to nd cost-e¢ cient emission reduction
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Figure 1: Regulatory standards for coal red power plants (in gg/Nm3)
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regulation.5
The countries in our data set that have been involved in coordinated e¤ort from
the beginning are Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. Almost all participating
countries ratied the Helsinki protocol already in 1987, which is also the year of
enforcement (see Appendix A for further details). Ratication of the Oslo protocol
has been more slowly and enforcement took e¤ect in 1998. The UK and Poland
participated only in the Oslo protocol, for which negotiations started in 1991. The
UK was also involved in the negotiations on the Helsinki protocol, but in the end
decided not to join. The U.S. and Japan kept out of cooperation under both the
Helsinki and the Oslo protocol.
5The nal event relevant for the specic regulation of SO2 emissions is the Gothenburg protocol
signed in 1999. This protocol is a comprehensive regulatory device that not only reduces acidi-
cation, but also eutrophication and ground-level ozone. It includes a di¤erentiation of emission
reduction obligations for 2010. The overall reduction target of SO2 emissions in Europe amounts
to at least 63% compared to 1990 levels. Ratication of the Gothenburg protocol has taken a lot
of time with formal enforcement only in 2005. Because we have patent data only until 1997 we
exclude the Gothenburg protocol from our analysis.
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Abatement e¤orts for SO2 emission reduction have been targeted predominantly
at (coal-red) power plants.6 Figure 1 shows the stringency levels for a typical
(large) coal-red power plant as well as their timing for several countries in our data
set in the period 1970-1997. As explained before, the U.S. and Japan (not in the
gure) took the lead, but their regulations did not di¤er substantially in practice
(see Popp, 2006, p.49).7 Japanese standards were tightened by amendments in 1970
and 1974. Under the CAA the U.S. imposed a technology-forcing regulation in 1977
by requiring a 90% removal e¢ ciency of SO2 emissions for new power plants. This
type of regulation was designed to ensure that the standards could basically be
met by using ue gas desulfurization (FGD) technology rather than by switching to
clean coal (e.g., Ackerman and Hassler, 1981). Thus, the environmental target was
unchanged, but the government specied how to reach it.
The countries that decided to cooperate under the LRTAP framework in 1979,
however, did not implement their rst restrictions on emissions until the 1980s. It
took until 1 June 1983 before Germany implemented emission standards for large
plants (>50 MWt). The regulations in Germany were at a level of 400 mg/m3 for
new plants. The other signatory countries typically imposed their regulations in
1986 or 1987, i.e., after their own ratication of the Helsinki protocol, usually at
less stringent levels compared to Germany. Except for the U.S., who maintained
the advanced 1977 stringency levels, most of the countries in Figure 1 increased
their stringency levels before the 1994 Oslo protocol, mainly by applying similar
standards to existing and also smaller plants. In Germany, for instance, the scope of
the original restriction of 400 mg/m3 for new power plants was widened to existing
plants in 1993.
3.2 Patent counts of SO2 abatement technologies
Patent counts are usually obtained from selecting relevant patent classes where the
classes themselves are further investigated by using keywords. As explained in de-
tail by Popp (2006), the use of European Classication (ECLA), instead of the
commonly used International Patent Classication (IPC) system, has the advantage
6We restrict ourselves to policies regarding power plants, because our patent counts are mainly
linked to these regulations. Moreover, these regulations are easily comparable across countries.
Popp (2006) o¤ers a detailed account of policy interventions in the U.S., Japan and Germany.
Information on country-specic regulation of coal-red power plants has been obtained from Placet
et al. (1988), Vernon (1988) and Sloss (2003). See Appendix A for further details.
7We exclude Japan from this graph because of its heterogeneous plant-by-plant regulations.
Because of heterogeneity of country, type and capacity of power plants, the standards in the graph
apply to large power plants (usually >300 MW).
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that changes in classes over time are no longer problematic, because patents are
reclassied as classes change.8 Popp (2006) identied the relevant patent classes
pertaining to pollution control by using keywords  in his case based on technolog-
ical information on SO2 and NOX abatement technologies which were extracted
from various sources. Popp then subsequently screened some individual patent doc-
uments to assess the relevance of frequently occuring ECLA classes (see p.B2 of
Appendix Popp, 2006).
We took a di¤erent approach in constructing our patent data set (see Appendix
B for a detailed description). As Lanjouw and Mody (1996) note, the commonly
followed procedure based on patent classes might su¤er from the possibility to obtain
patents which are not directly relevant for the specic eld, and the possibility
to loose relevant patents that are minorities in certain subclasses not selected by
the keyword search. To minimize these errors, we fed the on-line database of the
European Patent O¢ ce (EPO), esp@cenet, with keywords in order to identify all
relevant individual patents. The keywords were extracted from SO2 abatement
technologies as explicitly described in the well-known RAINS model, developed at
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (see Cofala and Syri, 1998).
We subsequently screened every single patent that came out of our search using
esp@cenet. The patents we obtained in this way cover abatement technologies such
as the use of low-sulfur fuels (including fuel desulfurization), in-furnace control of
SO2 emissions (e.g., through limestone injection or with several types of uidized
bed combustion), conventional wet ue gas desulfurization processes, advanced high
e¢ ciency methods for capturing sulfur from ue gas, and measures to control process
emissions. These patents mainly represent e¤orts to reduce SO2 emissions by coal-
red power plants.
The classication-basedsearch strategy performs rather di¤erently relative to
our keyword-based search strategy. Comparing our data with the number of counts
reported by Popp (2006) for Germany, Japan and the U.S., we nd remarkable
di¤erences. For these three countries the absolute levels are much higher with the
classication strategy, in particular Japan. Furthermore, only for Germany the
trend is similar given a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.83 between Popps total counts
and ours. The much lower coe¢ cient for Japan and the U.S., respectively 0.47 and
0.59, reconrms Lanjouw and Modys (1996) warning for classication errors.9
As a next step we distinguish mother and family patents based on their ap-
plication and priority number. Family members, which protect exactly the same
8Nowadays also the IPC accounts for this.
9We thank David Popp for making his data available to enable this comparison.
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invention as the mother patent, can be identied as having exactly the same pri-
ority numbers as the mother patent, but for which a di¤erent application number
is used due to ling in another country. Additionally, our patent database consists
of three types of patents: National patents (NP), European patents (EP) and In-
ternational patents (WO). EP and WO are single patents, providing protection of
intellectual property in multiple countries selected by the inventor.10 To capture all
knowledge ows we decomposed the EP and WO patents by assigning a count to
each of the countries selected by the inventor in the year of ling the EP or WO
patent. In order to prevent double counting, for instance when both a NP and an
EP are led for the same technology, we ranked the patents lexicographically in the
above stated order. Hence, we registered knowledge ows covered by an EP only if
they were not yet captured by national patents. The same holds for WO patents:
these knowledge ows were registered only if protection was not yet granted through
a NP or EP.11
Table 1 summarizes our counts and their distribution across countries for both
mother and family patents separately. Not only the numbers di¤er considerably
between countries but also the distribution across countries for mother and fam-
ily patents. Together, Germany, Japan and the U.S. produced 92% of all mother
patents, whereas only 26% of all family patents were led in these three dominating
countries. Hence, new inventions are concentrated in these three countries, of which
only Germany has been involved in the SO2 protocols. In contrast, family patents
spread remarkably equal across the countries in our sample. As the bulk (70%)
of the inventions can be found in non-signatory regions (Japan and the U.S.) it is
hardly surprising that the share of family patents is much lower in these countries
(27%).
4 A rst look at the data
Figures 2 and 3 depict the overall e¤orts to protect inventions in SO2 abatement
technologies between 1970 and 1997 in both signatory and non-signatory countries
through mother patents and their families, respectively. Quite di¤erent proles
emerge for mother and family patents in both signatory and non-signatory coun-
tries and across time. After an initial steep rise of mother patents in 1975,12 the
10Note that EP and WO applications must still be acted upon by national patent o¢ ces.
11Some specic cases are discussed in appendix B.
12In a personal communication Matsuno argues that our counts for this period are probably too
small due to language problems.
9
Table 1: Mother and family patent counts, 1970-1997
Mother Family
Total Share (%) Total Share (%)
Austria 17 0.8 190 6.1
Canada 19 0.9 135 4.3
Denmark 10 0.5 121 3.9
Finland 16 0.8 65 2.1
France 19 0.9 308 9.9
Germany 483 23.6 299 9.6
Italy 8 0.4 278 8.9
Japan 933 45.6 241 7.7
Luxemburg 3 0.1 151 4.8
Netherlands 3 0.1 260 8.3
Poland 26 1.3 68 2.2
Sweden 9 0.4 211 6.8
Switzerland 3 0.1 164 5.3
United Kingdom 36 1.8 375 12.0
U.S. 460 22.5 257 8.2
Total 2045 100.0 3123 100.0
Signatory 603 29.5 2292 73.4
Non-signatory 1442 70.5 831 26.6
overall number of inventions starts to rise again sharply in 1981 and peaks around
the Helsinki protocol. A second peak arises around Oslo, though less sharp. The
patterns di¤er greatly between signatory and non-signatory countries, however. The
sharp rise in mother patents in 1975 is explained almost only by activity in non-
signatory countries, whereas the rise before Helsinki is largely attributable to the rise
in patenting activity in the signatory countries. After Helsinki fewer and fewer new
patents are led in signatory countries, whereas inventive activity in non-signatory
countries remains more or less stable in the late 1980s. In 1992 patenting activity
starts to rise again in both signatory and non-signatory countries.
Figure 3 shows that the overall number of family patents is low on average
before the Helsinki protocol and then rises sharply in the run-up to the signing
of this protocol in 1985 and remains high afterwards. Peaks occur around 1987
as well as in 1995, just one year after the signing of the Oslo protocol.13 The
di¤erence in patenting activity between the signatory and non-signatory countries is
less remarkable than in the case of mother patents. The number of family patenting
13As expected, the peaks for family patents are somewhat later compared to mother patents
because of the available time lag of 12 months that applies to ling such patents relative to their
mother patents.
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Figure 2: Mother patents in signatory and non-signatory countries
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Figure 3: Family patents in signatory and non-signatory countries
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Figure 4: Ratio of region specic family patents to all one year lagged mother patents
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Year
R
at
io
Fam in signatory / Mother (t-1) Fam in non-sig / Mother (t-1)
Helsinki Oslo
Figure 5:
in signatory countries grows fast in the run-up period to Helsinki and remains high
thereafter. We do not observe a similar increase of family patenting activity in the
advent to Oslo, but the activity level remains high despite its erratic pattern at the
end of our observation period. One could argue that if protocols would stimulate
mother patents, then any increase in patent families would occur, just because more
mother patents are available for designation abroad. Figure 4 shows, however, that
this is unlikely by depicting the di¤erence in the ratio of family patents to one-year
lagged mother patents in signatory versus non-signatory countries.14 Both series
exhibit a similar pattern until 1983 but then start to diverge strongly.15 This suggests
that even if the Helsinki protocol would have promoted more mother patents, the
decision to le family patents is also a¤ected. Indeed, the value of a new invention,
as measured by the number of families relative to a mother patent in signatory
countries, has increased strongly after the negotiation and signing of the Helsinki
14We apply a lag since family patents can be led within one year from the mother patent.
15The high level of the ratio in the rst half of the 1970s is due to the increase in led Japanese
mother patents. The peak around 1980 is related to the signing of the non-binding agreement
under the LRTAP.
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protocol.
Our data suggest a clear e¤ect of the international negotiations on SO2 abatement
technologies. Mother patents peak around both protocols in both signatory and non-
signatory countries. Family patenting rises in signatory countries before the signing
of both protocols  though to a lesser extent around Oslo and remains persistently
high after Helsinki. This is at variance with the claim by Popp (2006) that only
domestic environmental policy determines patenting by domestic rms. Naturally
also local regulatory interventions play a role. For instance, the big spike in the
mid 1980s in signatory countries is largely attributable to German patents, which
is likely to be inuenced by new German legislation for coal-red power plants in
1983. Also the U.S. introduced the Clean Air Act (CAA) in 1990 announcing its
emissions trading program to be phased-in in 1995. This more or less coincides with
the signing of the Oslo protocol in 1994. In the sequel we therefore control for local
regulation in our econometric analysis.
5 Econometric specication and estimation
In this section, we present the econometric model to test whether a di¤erential e¤ect
of patent lings in both signatory and non-signatory countries exists in relation to
the establishment of the Helsinki and Oslo protocol. The dependent variables are
the aggregate numbers of the led mother and family patents in the 15 countries
between 1970 and 1997.16 We study both run-up and permanent e¤ects by modelling
the Helsinki and Oslo protocols on SO2 abatement as event variables. As explained
before, the run-up e¤ect accounts for forward looking behavior by inventors during
the negotiation process whereas the permanent e¤ect has to do with additional
patenting beyond the implementation of the protocols.
Because both our dependent variables are counts of led patents, we apply a
conditional xed e¤ects Poisson panel model.17 We assume the following conditional
16Note that we do not model patent lings by country of origin. We restrict our econometric
analysis to the total amount of mother or family patents on SO2 abatement in a given country.
These patents might originate from both domestic and foreign rms. However, our distinction
between mother and family patents implicitly accounts for origin and designation, because mother
patents are typically led in the inventorsown countries and family patents in other countries.
Also the distribution across countries of both mother and family patents is asymmetric as described
in subsection 3.2.
17A similar approach is used by Acemoglu and Linn (2004). See Wooldridge (2002), p.674¤ for
details on the estimation strategy.
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mean function for the SO2 abatement patents:
E [Pitjci; t;Xit] = exp(ci + t+ Xit +  RUNUPit +   PERMit); (1)
where E is the expectations operator, Pit is the number of mother (or family) patents
led in country i in year t; ci represents country xed e¤ects, t species year e¤ects
capturing any common time component and the vector Xit contains country-specic
control variables, to be discussed below.
Our main variables of interest are the event (dummy) variables RUNUP and
PERM; which respectively reect the potential e¤ects of patent lings in the advent
to the signing of the protocol and its permanent impact. We dene RUNUP to be
equal to one for signatory countries in the years of the actual signing of the Helsinki
and Oslo protocol as well as during a predened anticipation period. Furthermore,
we allow for asymmetric impacts of the Helsinki and Oslo protocol and control for
their individual e¤ects separately. We study the permanent e¤ect by the separate
variable PERM which equals one in the signatory countries for the whole period
after the signing of the Helsinki protocol. We estimate (1) with RUNUP and
PERM separately as well as jointly.
To identify di¤erences in patent ling behavior between rms in signatory and
non-signatory countries we estimate both variables by using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence
approach. To get rid of unobserved heterogeneity represented by the country xed
e¤ects in our panel estimation we follow Hausman et al. (1984). We accordingly
factor out the heterogeneity component (ci) through the conditional logit transfor-
mation to obtain a multinomial distribution for Pit of the form:
E[Pitjt;Xit;
_
Pi] =
exp (t +  Xit +  RUNUPit +   PERMit)PT
=1 exp ( +  Xi +  RUNUPi +   PERMi )
_
Pi; (2)
where
_
Pi =
PT
t=1 Pit is the total number of led patents in country i over the
entire sample period. This transformation allows consistent estimation of our main
parameters of interest ( and ) by applying Quasi Maximum Likelihood. These
parameters show the expected percentage change in patent lings in the signatory
countries as opposed to not being a signatory country in that year. We estimate (2)
using robust standard errors.
If the protocols have a di¤erential e¤ect on the number of mother and family
patents led in signatory countries, we expect  and/or  to be positive and sig-
nicant. The exact timing of the anticipation period associated with the run-up
e¤ect is open and ultimately depends on the forward looking behavior of the in-
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venting rms. For instance, we expect that the technology seminars organized by
LRTAP have played an important role. With a 5-year interval, starting in May
1981 in Salzburg (Austria), these technology seminars reviewed available control
technologies (Sliggers and Kakebeeke, 2004). Moreover, they also integrated tech-
nical knowledge into the protocols annexes, such as the ue gas desulfurization
technology in 1981. By dening the important types of technologies a signal was
provided to innovators on potential directions to explore in their research programs
and/or designate protection of existing inventions across di¤erent (participating)
countries. The timing of these seminars (1981, 1986 and 1991) is such that a lag of
more than 3 years is unlikely. We focus on a 2 year lag and set our event dummies
equal to one in 1983-1985 and 1992-1994 for only those countries that actually signed
the Helsinki and Oslo protocol (see Table 2). We conduct robustness tests of our
results with alternative specications of the length of the event variable. For the
models that evaluate a permanent e¤ect of the signing of the protocols in signatory
countries, we set the variable PERM equal to one for the whole period after the
signing of the Helsinki protocol, i.e., 1986-1997.18
Table 2: Treatment dummy for signatory countries (RUNUP ) in anticipation to
the signing of the protocols
Dummy Helsinki Dummy Oslo
Austria 1983-1985 1992-1994
Canada 1983-1985 1992-1994
Denmark 1983-1985 1992-1994
Finland 1983-1985 1992-1994
France 1983-1985 1992-1994
Germany 1983-1985 1992-1994
Italy 1983-1985 1992-1994
Japan No No
Luxemburg 1983-1985 1992-1994
Netherlands 1983-1985 1992-1994
Poland No 1992-1994
Sweden 1983-1985 1992-1994
Switzerland 1983-1985 1992-1994
United Kingdom No 1992-1994
U.S. No No
As country-specic control variables we employ, rst of all, the share of coal-based
electricity in total electricity (labeled COAL SHARE). Countries with a high coal
18For the UK and Poland the dummy is equal to one for 1995-1997, i.e., the years after they
became a member of LRTAP.
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share are more likely to impose tighter restrictions and therefore seem to be targeted
rst by rms seeking protection of their new inventions. Furthermore, we include the
overall number of patents for all types of technologies (labeled TOTAL PATENTS)
led in each country as a scaling variable. Countries may di¤er systematically in
rates of acceptance of patent applications, in how much research they do or 
given the amount of inventing activity how active rms are in patenting. In the
estimations for the family patents we add a separate variable (labeled LAGGED
MOTHER OTHER) that controls for all new knowledge (both within signatory
and non-signatory countries) that became available outside a specic country, say
i, for designation into this country i in the year before the family itself was actually
led, i.e., X it 1. Table 3 provides some descriptive statistics for our dependent and
control variables.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, 1970-1997
Variable Number Unit Mean St.Dev Min Max
Mother patents 420 count 4.87 11.62 0 69
Family patents 405 count 7.71 6.34 0 26
Coal share 420 % electricity production 0.34 0.30 0 0.97
Total patents 420 count (1,000) 3.78 6.99 0 34.73
Lagged mother other 405 count 67.55 30.60 3 134
6 Main results
Formother patents the rst column of Table 4 provides evidence for a signicant up-
ward run-up e¤ect for new inventions in signatory countries of the Helsinki protocol.
The absolute number of mother patents rises in signatory and non-signatory coun-
tries in both run-up periods (see Figure 2), but the likelihood to observe additional
patent lings in the signatory countries is considerably higher around Helsinki. The
expected number of led mother patents in signatory countries during the run-up
period before Helsinki increases by 147%. For the Oslo protocol the e¤ect is negative,
though not signicant at the 10% level.
Key to the correct identication of an independent e¤ect of the protocols is to
control for local regulation. Therefore, column 2 presents results of a specication
that controls for major changes in local environmental policy in the main inventing
countries  Germany and the U.S. around the signing of the protocols. Assuming
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the same anticipation period for inventions as for the protocols, we set these dummies
equal to 1 for Germany in the period 1981-1983, since Germany tightened local
regulation in 1983, and equal to 1 for the U.S. in the period 1993-1995 because of
the introduction of the CAA in 1995. The results conrm, rst of all, Popps (2006)
nding that local regulation induced new inventions in Germany. But we nd in
addition evidence of a strong positive run-up e¤ect for Helsinki. Inventive activity in
Germany continued even after its local regulation was already enforced, i.e. during
the run-up period to Helsinki. Furthermore, we still nd a positive run-up e¤ect
for Helsinki when the main inventing signatory country Germany is excluded from
the sample, although the e¤ect is smaller. Thus, the Helsinki protocol also had an
e¤ect on inventors in other small inventing signatory countries outside Germany (see
column (3)). Clearly coal share has no e¤ect in the specifations including Germany,
but column (3) indicates new inventions are more likely to take place in countries
with a high coal share.
Table 4: Two year lag e¤ect of protocols on mother patents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incl local policy Excl GER Permanent
Run-up Helsinki 1.47 (0.15)*** 1.41 (0.15)*** 0.85 (0.35)** 1.85 (0.34)***
Run-up Oslo - 0.35 (0.22) - 0.41 (0.22)* 0.04 (0.29) - 0.47 (0.24)*
Permanent 0.86 (0.47)*
Policy Germany 0.54 (0.16)*** 0.68 (0.26)***
Policy U.S. - 0.33 (0.08)*** - 0.28 (0.09)*** - 0.18 (0.12)
Coal share - 0.38 (1.83) - 0.80 (1.87) 1.59 (0.91)* 1.21 (1.76)
Total patents 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02)
Log likelihood -608 -600 -466 -589
Number of obs. 420 420 392 420
Groups 15 15 14 15
Standard errors within parenthesis. ***[**](*) denotes signicance at the 1[5](10) percent level
Our ndings for the Oslo protocol are very di¤erent compared to Helsinki. Even
though we observe a peak in mother patenting activity in signatory countries in
1994 (see Figure 2), our estimates reect no evidence of additional activity within
the signatory countries relative to the non-signatory countries. Instead, we nd a
weakly negative e¤ect for the run-up e¤ect in the signatory countries as well as a
strongly signicant negative correlation with the U.S. policy dummy around that
time. Mother patenting activity in the advent to both Oslo and the new CAA
regulation on emissions trading in the U.S. in 1995 is mainly concentrated in Japan.
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Both the observed upward e¤ect in Germany and the U.S. pales into insignicance
compared to the additional activity in Japan before and in 1995. Given these trends
in the three major inventing countries it is hardly surprising that we do not nd any
e¤ect for the Oslo protocol.19
We conclude that the run-up e¤ects for new inventions visible in Figure 2 seems
to be at least partly triggered by the negotiations on the protocols. In particular,
the peak in 1985 (Helsinki) in signatory countries cannot be explained by changes
in local regulation only. For the renewal of the protocol in 1994 we do not nd such
evidence. Indeed disentangling the impact of the protocol in 1994 and changes in
U.S. policy in 1995 is less clear. Moreover, the number of mother patents in non-
signatory countries, in particular Japan, grew even faster than those in signatory
countries since 1992. This suggests that inventors outside signatory countries may
also respond to credible announcements of regulation in countries that participate
in a joint e¤ort to reduce emissions.
We have also tested whether a permanent e¤ect can be observed in addition to
the run-up e¤ect for mother patents. Column (4) in Table 4 provides some evidence
for this hypothesis, but the evidence is weak. Moreover, this e¤ect is mainly due to
German inventors, for which the number of led mother patents actually gradually
declined in the late 80s. Also the gradual shift in inventive activity towards Japan
a¤ects the identication of a permanent e¤ect.
The estimates for the family patents in the run-up period provide evidence for the
hypothesis that IEAs improve market conditions for new inventions: the expected
number of led family patents in signatory countries in the years before and the
year of the signing of Helsinki increases by 28% on average and even 69% for Oslo
(see column 1 in Table 5). An indication that family patents spread to countries
that do not have a large inventive sector is the negative correlation with the total
number of patents led in specic countries. As expected, the number of led family
patents in a country increases if additional mother patent activity takes place in
other countries. Again coal share has no signicant e¤ect in this simple specication.
We also estimated the model with policy dummies for local regulation in Germany
in 1983 and U.S. regulation in 1995. The results for our main variables of interest
are almost entirely similar (see column 2 in Table 5). Somewhat surprisingly, we
nd evidence for signicantly less family patenting in the years before the major
19Note also that the results for the Oslo protocol are in concordance with Popps (2006) obser-
vation that Japanese patents were the only case where foreign patents were increasing when U.S.
regulations tightened. However, the additional activity in Japan could also (or in addition) be
triggered by an expected increase (in stringency) of regulation in signatory countries.
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change in U.S. regulation. This is mainly explained by the peak of family patents
in signatory countries in 1995, which is not covered by the run-up dummy.
Table 5: Two year lag e¤ect of protocols on family patents
(1) (2) (3)
Incl local policy Permanent
Run-up Helsinki 0.28 (0.12)** 0.28 (0.12)** 0.48 (0.18)**
Run-up Oslo 0.69 (0.15)*** 0.62 (0.12)*** 0.59 (0.12)***
Permanent 0.31 (0.15)**
Policy Germany - 0.02 (0.09) - 0.01 (0.09)
Policy U.S. - 0.24 (0.10)** - 0.19 (0.10)*
Coal share 0.98 (0.65) 0.98 (0.65) 1.17 (0.78)
Total patents - 0.05 (0.02)*** - 0.05 (0.02)*** - 0.04 (0.02)**
Lagged mother other 0.01 (0.00)** 0.01 (0.00)** 0.01 (0.00)***
Log likelihood -917 -917 -887
Number of obs 405 405 405
Groups 15 15 15
Standard errors within parenthesis ***[**](*) denotes signicance at the 1[5](10) percent level.
In addition to the signicant run-up e¤ects for both protocols, we also nd
evidence for a signicant permanent e¤ect within the signatory countries (see column
3 in Table 5). Note that the loglikelihood of the latter specication is much improved.
These ndings again suggest that inventors not only respond to policy signals in their
own country, but also consider the protocols to provide credible signals of increasing
demand for abatement technologies in other signatory countries.
The general picture that emerges is that the IEAs have explanatory power for
both the development of new inventions as well as for their international di¤usion.
The Helsinki protocol is strongly correlated with additional activity in both mother
and family patents within signatory countries before its signing also if we control
for local policies and the overall number of new inventions outside the designated
countries. For the Oslo protocol we do not observe an increase in mother patenting
in signatory countries, but the number of designated family patents in signatory
countries as well as the permanent e¤ect on the overall number of families since
Helsinki illustrates the relevance of IEAs for inventors in making their protection
decisions.
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7 Identication problems and robustness analysis
Several issues deserve closer scrutiny. Our hypothesis is that rms respond to chang-
ing prospects induced by a credible IEA. The IEA either serves as an early signal of
upcoming (more) stringent regulation and/or turns the cooperating countries into a
(relatively) attractive market. One might wonder, however, whether not the same
amount and distribution of innovation would have occured were the treaties never
adopted. One reason could be that only countries that had a clear interest in the
IEA decided to participate, e.g. to benet from the pool of knowledge, and those
who had no such interest simply did not join. A second reason is that simultaneity
problems complicate separating the e¤ect of the IEA from local regulatory e¤ects.
Finally, institutional di¤erences in the propensity to patent and alternative controls
could also a¤ect our results. We will address these three issues below.
7.1 Endogenous participation decisions
It is hard to belief that our results su¤er from selective participation decisions by
countries. If anything we learn from our distinction between mother and family
patents, it is that inventing rms, not countries, are responsive to changing market
conditions. Firms consider an IEA as an early signal of upcoming regulations in par-
ticipating countries or  depending on the credibility of the IEA  as a continuous
signal for a lasting market. However, countries make their participation decisions
in relation to whether or not they can organize reduction commitments properly.
Victim countries try to commit polluters, which is complicated if the externality is
not bilateral, such as in the case of the UK.
Furthermore, endogeneity is likely to be a problem if patterns between non-
signatory and signatory countries are very di¤erent before the event. This is clearly
not the case for family patents, but might be relevant for mother patents (compare
Figures 2 and 3). However, participation in the IEA is by no means a necessary
condition to directly benet from the options provided by the coalition. Inventing
rms outside the coalition, like those in the U.S. and Japan, can always use families
to protect their new inventions inside the coalition. And this is exactly what is
illustrated by the diverging pattern between the inow of family patents in signatory
and non-signatory countries after the negotiations on the Helsinki protocol started
(and which is conrmed by our variable PERM in Table 5 column (3)).
Further evidence against our analysis being perverted by endogeneity problems
comes from the U.K. If the goal would have been access to the knowledge pool, the
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UK should have signed for sure because of its large share of coal-based electricity
generation. In fact, the UK did not sign the Helsinki protocol and only decided much
later to participate in the Oslo protocol. Also serious stringent local regulation of
coal-red power plants had to wait until 1991 when the UK was obliged to implement
the EU Coal Combustion Plant Directive. One of the main reasons behind the UKs
weak incentives to commit was that most of its SO2 emissions were transported
out of the UK whilst very little SO2 emissions entered into the UK from abroad.
In addition, on a more domestic level, around the timing of the Helsinki protocol
the UK was also considering to privatise the electricity sector and its future energy
requirements were uncertain (see Albin, 2001, p.69).
Furthermore, closer inspection of our data also suggest that participation in
the Helsinki protocol was not necessary at all to get access to the knowledge pool.
The mother patent data show that inventive activity was always present in the
UK in the pre-Helsinki period (see Figure 5). Only when it became clear that
the UK did not participate in the Helsinki protocol, new patents were no longer
led. Furthermore, inventors abroad always included this country in their knowledge
protection considerations. The number of family patents in the UK was always
highest of all countries in our data set and also closely followed the trend in other
signatory countries (see Figure 5). The UK remained an important target, because
the 1988 EU Large Combustion Plant Directive made it plausible that the country
had to adapt its policies anyway. These observations are conrmed when we re-
estimate our basic specication with the UK included as a signatory country.20
7.2 IEA versus regulatory e¤ects
To identify the IEA e¤ects as separate from and additional to local regulatory e¤ects
our basic specication already controls for the major local policy e¤ects in countries
that host most important inventors, typically Germany and the U.S.,21 as well as a
coal share variable as a proxy for (anticipated) local policy e¤ects in other countries.
An alternative way to potentially control for this problem is using ratication dates
as a proxy for the introduction of (anticipated) more stringent local regulation.
Appendix A shows that in particular ratication for Helsinki is a good proxy for
increased local stringency. Ratication often occurs in the same or one year before
the introduction of more stringent local measures.
20This only has a small e¤ect on the coe¢ cients and never changes our ndings in a fundamental
way. Also excluding the UK from our sample has no signicant e¤ect on the results (results available
upon request).
21Note that Japans regulatory environment is much di¤erent (compare Immura, 2005).
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Figure 6: The ling of mother and family patents in the UK
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We therefore constructed a raticationdummy. This dummy allows for invent-
ing rms anticipating local regulation to become more stringent only after rati-
cation, and not because a country negotiates and signs the IEA as such. For this
purpose we use country-specic information on the year of ratication by the proto-
col participants applying the same two-year anticipation period. For instance, the
run-up dummy for Austria is equal to one in the years 1985-1987, respectively 1996-
1997, because Austria ratied the Helsinki protocol in 1987 and the Oslo protocol
in 1998.
Interestingly, the estimations based on this ratication dummy indeed generate
smaller and less signicant results compared to the earlier IEA e¤ect based on the
pre-negotiation period (see columns 1 and 2 in Table 6).22 For mother patents
we still observe a signicant and positive e¤ect for Helsinki but the e¤ect is much
smaller. The run-up e¤ect for Oslo is still strongly negative and signicant whereas
the permanent e¤ect no longer obtains. Apparently inventors already anticipated
upcoming changes in local regulation in signatory countries during the negotiation
process and did not wait for the ratication process. Similar results obtain from our
22Note that the loglikelihoods for all our estimations with the ratication dummy are lower than
for our basic models. Also the marginal e¤ects are lower.
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estimates for family patents (see columns 3 and 4 in Table 6). Still a signicant,
but smaller run-up e¤ect exists for ratication after Helsinki and both the run-up
e¤ect for Oslo and the and permanent e¤ect are no longer signicant. We conclude
that our hypothesis that negotiation processes on protocols have a role on their
own makes more sense than to assume that inventing rms anticipate stricter local
regulatory interventions that come about 4 to 5 years later.23
Table 6: Robustness analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Mother Patents Mother Patents Family Patents Family Patents
Ratication Ratication Ratication Ratication
Run-up Helsinki 1.17 (0.10)*** 1.16 (0.10)*** 0.21 (0.09)** 0.21 (0.09)***
Run-up Oslo - 0.68 (0.16)*** - 0.68 (0.18)*** - 0.06 (0.12) - 0.06 (0.12)
Permanent - 0.24 (0.27) 0.15 (0.10)
Policy Germany 1.11 (0.11)*** 1.03 (0.16)*** 0.05 (0.09) 0.07 (0.09)
Policy U.S. - 0.25 (0.15)* - 0.30 (0.16)* - 0.52 (0.11)*** - 0.47 (0.10)***
Coal share - 0.56 (1.42) - 1.11 (1.70) 0.97 (0.62) 1.05 (0.69)
Total patents - 0.00 (0.01) - 0.01 (0.02) - 0.05 (0.02)*** - 0.04 (0.02)***
Lagged mother other 0.01 (0.00)*** 0.01 (0.00)***
Log likelihood -607 -605 -921 -919
Number of obs. 420 420 405 405
Groups 15 15 15 15
Standard errors within parenthesis. ***[**](*) denotes signicance at the 1[5](10) percent level.
A related issue is the choice of the length of the event dummy representing the
negotiation process itself. The choice of a two-year lag seems somewhat arbitrary,
because we do not exactly know how and when policy signals a¤ect inventors. There-
fore we ran several alternative specications using longer or shorter lag lengths, i.e.,
three years and one year respectively.24 For the longer window of anticipation we
nd fairly similar results for mother, but not for family patents (see Table 7).25 In
the estimations for mother patents only the local policy dummy for Germany is no
longer signicant, which is likely to be explained by the overlap with the Helsinki
23Note that the stringency of the local standards themselves are also likely to be conditional on
the IEA itself. However, whether or not the Helsinki protocol has lead to stricter local regulations
than those that would have been obtained under unilateral action is still an open question (see
Barrett, 2003).
24In the three (one) year lag model we set our event dummy equal to one in 1982-1985 (1984-1985)
and 1991-1994 (1993-1994) for all countries that signed the Helsinki and Oslo protocol.
25For the one year lag model nothing of importance changes either whether or not we test with
or without the inclusion of Germany.
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run-up dummy in 1982 and 1983.26 In contrast, our family patent estimates now
showmuch smaller and less signicant e¤ects. As one might expect, the e¤ects
on the where toprotect decision become stronger when the protocol date comes
closer and the likelihood of an agreement increases.
Table 7: Robustness analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Mother Patents Family Patents Mother Patents Family Patents
Lag 3 Lag 3 Scaling Japan Excl DK/FIN
Run-up Helsinki 1.36 (0.14)*** 0.35 (0.19)* 1.28 (0.18)*** 0.58 (0.17)**
Run-up Oslo - 0.41 (0.20)** 0.53 (0.06)*** - 0.38 (0.24) 0.58 (0.13)***
Permanent 0.26 (0.17) 0.37 (0.16)**
Policy Germany 0.00 (0.13) 0.08 (0.10) 0.59 (0.18)*** - 0.07 (0.08)
Policy U.S. - 0.33 (0.09)*** - 0.22 (0.08)*** - 0.16 (0.16) - 0.13 (0.10)
Coal share - 0.67 (1.87) 1.11 (0.77) - 2.25 (1.95) 1.27 (0.89)
Total patents - 0.00 (0.01) - 0.04 (0.02)** 0.00 (0.02) - 0.03 (0.01)**
Lagged mother other 0.01 (0.00)*** 0.01 (0.00)***
Log likelihood -607 -914 -523 -783
Number of obs. 420 405 420 351
Groups 15 15 15 13
Standard errors within parenthesis. ***[**](*) denotes signicance at the 1[5](10) percent level.
7.3 Di¤erences in institutional rules in patent protection
A nal issue are institutional di¤erences in the legal protection of ideas across coun-
tries. In Japan, for example, every claim needs to be led as a separate patent,
whereas in other countries a single patent can hold several claims.27 This might
give rise to a disproportionally large number of Japanese patents and cause biased
results. Eaton and Kortum (1999, p.542) estimate that the ling of patents in Japan
is 5 times as large as elsewhere. If we divide the number of Japanese mother patents
by 5 and re-estimate our basic specication, we only observe minor changes in our
results (see column 3 in Table 7).
Another concern is that the overall number of family counts might be a¤ected
by the growing importance of so-called European patents (EP) and international
26This illustrates the risk of overidentication if too many overlapping time dummies are included
in the estimations. Further experimentation with the cross-section without Germany conrms our
previous results. The negative e¤ect for Oslo is still entirely due to the observed (lack of) ling of
mother patents in Germany in this period and simply disappears in this case. Results are available
on request.
27The problem only exists for mother patents.
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patents (WO) (see Section 3.2). For example, an EP patent granted by the Dutch
patent o¢ ce guarantees protection in a number of selected member states (i.e., indi-
cated/selected by the inventor) of the European Patent Convention (EPC) or Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) within Europe. Due to these treaties, seeking protection
in multiple countries has become cheaper. According to Eaton et al. (2004) the
number of EP publications grew with 70% between 1991 and 2000, whereas also the
number of destinations designated for protection in a typical EP (family size) has
grown substantially in this period.
Because we treat the family members of an EP as separate counts and all of our
sample signatory countries except one (Canada) are located in Europe, we face two
potential biases. First, the observed increase in the number of led family patents,
which we attributed to the IEA negotiations and signing, may have been (partially)
caused by the reduction in costs of ling additional family patents. Second, if more
countries join the patent treaties one expects an increase in the average size of patent
families due to the reduction in marginal protection costs and not because of the
incentives provided by our main events. For instance, Denmark and Finland signed
the EPC respectively in 1990 and 1996 and both countries show a strong increase
in led family members afterwards.
The ling of EP and WO patents has been possible since the late seventies. We
observe the rst EP and WO patents in our data base in 1978. Until the mid 1990s
the number of EP and WO patents has increased steadily (see Figure 5). During
the entire sample period the share of EP and WO patents never went beyond 60%
of all of our family counts. In total 287 EP and 97 WO patents have been led up to
1997, whereas we found 756 family patents led at national o¢ ces.28 Even in 1997
still 26 of an overall number of 60 abatement technologies were led at the national
o¢ ces, whereas only 24 were EP and 10 WO. Moreover, the number of nationally
led family patents in the U.S., Canada and Japan uctuates around 60% already
since the early 1980s. These observations support the Eaton et al. (2004) ndings
that the growth in EP publications was not at the expense of patents sought directly
through national patent o¢ ces. The increase in the share of the overall number of
EP and WO patents is quite strong in the periods 1981-1986 and 1991-1994 followed
by steep declines in both cases. These periods coincide with the advent to Helsinki
in 1985 and Oslo in 1994. This development is in stark contrast with the much more
gradual penetration pattern for all EP patenting as described by Eaton et al. (2004).
28Given that our overall number of family counts is 3,123 simple arithmetics learns that these
384 (287+97) EP and WO patents account in total for 2,367 family members, or 6 designated
countries on average.
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Figure 7: Share of EPO and WO patents in overall counts
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Hence, the protocols may have acted as an additional trigger for EP in this specic
technology subeld. If rms seek protection for their inventions in foreign countries,
they are likely to exploit opportunities to reduce their cost of protection. And this is
precisely what EPs o¤er. Moreover, most European countries cooperating through
the protocols also participated in the EPC treaty.
Even if EPs and WOs have not entirely substituted for national patent o¢ ces
lings, their likely e¤ect on family size of a given invention may still give rise to some
concern. In the late 1990s a number of factors induced the movement to universality
in Europe (Eaton et al., 2004). By 2000 most EPs designated all EPO members for
protection. Fees for a given EP fell dramatically in 1997 with 33% reduction for a
single EP and a 50% for the cost of each additional country designated for protection.
Moreover, since 1999 no additional fees are levied for EPs designated for over seven
EPO members. So it is hardly surprising that Eaton et al. (2004) nd evidence
that the tendency to universality can be explained by these price changes. With our
sample period ending in 1997, these factors are unlikely to have biased our results.
Indeed, only at the end of our sample period (1995-1997) we nd some evidence of
a co-movement of European family patents. Even then signicant di¤erences in the
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number of family patents applied in di¤erent EPO member states remained. As a
nal check we estimated our basic specication without Denmark and Finland in
the sample, because they joint the patent treaties during the sample period. Our
main conclusions are not a¤ected (see column 4 in Table 8).
8 Conclusions
This paper supports the idea that IEAs can provide important signals for rms to
invest in new technologies as well as to protect their inventions abroad in anticipation
to changes in market size in the nearby future. Firms anticipate the potential benet
of such international agreements and exploit the advantages of the protocols for their
market expansion through the designation of their family patents. IEA negotiations
cast their shadows even before they become operational and more stringent policy
measures are implemented. Our analysis of SO2 abatement technologies illustrates
that inventing rms respond to expected changes not only to local but also to changes
in international environmental policy.
Although our main result di¤ers from Popp (2006), the two studies also comple-
ment each other. First of all, our unique set of patent counts conrms the inventive
dominance of the three major countries in ue gas desulfurization technology  the
U.S., Japan and Germany because they cover most of the mother patents. Second,
our broader set of countries shows how countries that do not host major inventive
industries benet from knowledge transfers through international cooperation. In
addition, however, we observe that these transfers ow around the world in antici-
pation not only of local but also international signals. Knowledge transfers through
international markets are very likely to happen if opportunities for new markets
open up soon.
Whether or not the additional transfer of knowledge within signatory countries
as a result of the SO2 protocols also had an impact on emission reductions cannot
be concluded from our analysis. Our data only show that IEAs, or at least the
expectation that an IEA will come into existence, induce inventive activities and
the transfer of knowledge. Accordingly, the benet from protocols seems to be the
international di¤usion of new knowledge in the rst place. This is not only in the
interest of the countries that lack innovative rms, but also in the interest of these
innovative rms themselves (and their host countries).
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Appendix A SO2 protocols and local regulation
Table A.1 summarizes the countries emission reduction commitments under the
Helsinki and Oslo protocols, as well as the year of ratication. Countries without
any form of commitment under Helsinki were Japan, United States, United King-
dom and Poland. The latter two committed to emissions reduction under the Oslo
protocol up to 50% and 37%, respectively. Whereas the Helsinki protocol implied a
uniform emission reduction of 30 percent, the Oslo protocol allowed for di¤erentiated
reduction targets. Germany committed itself to the biggest reduction (83%). Other
countries with relatively high commitment levels under the Oslo protocol are Aus-
tria and the Scandinavian countries Denmark, Finland, Sweden (all 80%), closely
followed by the Netherlands (77%) and France (74%).
Table A.1: International SO2 emission reduction cooperation
1985 Helsinki Protocol 1994 Oslo Protocol
Ratication Commitmenta) Ratication Commitmentb)
Austria 1987 -30% 1998 -80%
Canada 1985 -30% 1997 -30%
Denmark 1986 -30% 1997* -80%
Finland 1986 -30% 1998** -80%
France 1986* -30% 1997* -74%
Germany 1987 -30% 1998 -83%
Italy 1990 -30% 1998 -65%
Japan No No No No
Luxemburg 1987 -30% 1996 -58%
Netherlands 1986** -30% 1995** -77%
Poland No No No*** -37%
Sweden 1986 -30% 1995 -80%
Switzerland 1987 -30% 1998 -52%
United Kingdom No No 1996 -50%
U.S. No No No No
a) Uniform 30% emission reduction targets from 1980 SOx levels by 1993
b) Di¤erentiated emission reduction targets from 1980 SOx levels by 2000
* No ratication, but approval; ** No ratication, but acceptance;
*** Signing but no ratication (yet)
Source: UNECE (http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/)
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For each country a systematic overview of the various local policies is given below.
Data have been obtained from Placet et al. (1988), Vernon (1988) and Sloss (2003).
All measures are in mg/Nm3, except noted otherwise. The various regulations were
mainly targeted at power plants. Regulatory data for Germany, Japan and the U.S.
are checked with Popp (2006). For additional regulatory information on these latter
countries see also appendix A of his study.
 Austria
 1986: 3000 for 50-100MW; 2000 for 100-200MW; 90% desulf. for >200MW
 1987: 400 for >400 M
 1989: 400 for lignite >10MW; 400 for hard coal 10-50MW; 200 for >50MW
 Canada
 1986: 740 for all new boilers
 Denmark
 1986: 860 for >100MW new
 1987: 860 for >50MW new
 1990: 700 for >100MW new
 1991: 400 for new utilities >500MW/therm
 Finland
 1987: 600 for 50-150MW new; 370 for>150MW new; 600 for>200MW existing
 1988: 400 for >150 MW new
 France
 1986: 72% of sulfur in coal
 1988: 683 for Paris
 Germany
 1983: 400 for new plants; 2000 for existing plants
 1993: 400 for existing plants
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 Italy
 1986: no statutory limits
 1987: 1200 for >100MW; 400 after 2-3 years
 1990: 1200 for 100-500MW; 400 for >500MW
 1991: sliding scale 1700-400 for 100-500MW
 2000: 2000 for 50 100MW; sliding scale 2000-400 for 100-500MW
 Japan
 1968: SO2 regulations vary by plant according to formula29
 Netherlands
 1986: 700 for <300MW new and existing; 400 for >300MW new
 1991: 200 for >300MW new
 1992: 700 for <300MW existing
 1994: 400/200 for >300MW existing
 Sweden
 1986: 572-972 for plants emitting <800 tons sulfur; 286-572 for plants emitt
>800 tons sulfur
 1987: 100-170 gram sulfur/GJ fuel input average for plants emitting <400
tons sulfur/year; 50-100 g sulfur/GJ fuel input average for plants emitting
>400 tons sulfur/year
 1990: 190 gram sulfur/GJ fuel input yearly average for existing plant; 50 g
sulfur/GJ fuel input yearly average for new plants
 1995: 30 gram sulfur/GJ fuel input yearly average for plant >500MW
 Switzerland
 1986: 2000 for all
 1987: 2000 for 1-300MW; 400 for > 300MW
 1995: 2000 for 1-100MW; 400 for > 100MW
 United Kingdom
 1991: 2000 for 50-100MW; 400 for >500MW
29Based on regions environmental quality and plants e¤ective stack height. See p.A3 of appen-
dix in Popp (2006) for an overview of Japanese air pollution regulations.
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 United States
 1970: Passage of 1970 Clean Air Act setting 1480 for new plants
 1977: Passage of 1977 CAA setting 1480 plus an additional 90% SO2 removal
for new plants
 1990: Passage of 1990 CAA setting goals for reducing SO2 emissions through
permit trading in two phases applied to power plants30
 1995: Phase I emissions trading, covering the 263 dirtiest, large generating
existing power plants in the country
 2000: Phase II emissions trading, covering virtually all (new as well as existing)
power plants in the country
30See, for instance, Joskow et al. (1998).
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Appendix B Patent data description
We use patent data obtained from the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO), based in The
Hague, the Netherlands. The EPO identies patents around the world by using
both the International Patent Classication (IPC) and the more detailed European
Classication System (ECLA). EPOs database can be accessed in di¤erent ways.
The common approach is to use the online database esp@cenet.31 This classica-
tion scheme has a nested structure and allows for searches for specic technologies,
such as sulfur dioxide abatement technologies. Also Popp (2006) follows this pro-
cedure as explained in his detailed Appendix. Given the search outcomes, some
individual patent documents are subsequently screened to tally frequently occurring
ECLA classes, where the classes were assessed on their relevance for pollution con-
trol technologies (see p.B2 of appendix Popp, 2006). In this way Popp obtains
four classes that he considers representative for sulfur dioxide control technolo-
gies: B01D53/14H8, B01D53/50, B01D53/86B4 and F23C10. For instance, class
B01D53/50 refers to the class of performing operations that aim at separation of
gases or vapors, in particular those that purify waste gases, and specically those
targeted at the removal of dened structure like sulfur compounds.
In constructing our patent data set we followed a di¤erent approach. In close
cooperation with EPO experts we also rst constructed a base set by means of
keywords but now in order to identify all relevant individual patents, not classes.
So we fed the entire esp@cenet database with keywords. We rst used general
keywords (step 1) and then imposed combined group-related keywords (step 2).
Step 1 and step 2 yielded a set of potentially relevant patents, which were then
screened individually on the basis of patent abstracts (step 3) to determine whether
the patent was explicitly related to SO2 abatement or not. If not, the patent was
eliminated from the set; it remained in the set otherwise. This third step in the
patent retrieval procedure is a distinctive feature of our database. The nal step
in the procedure (step 4) implied the search for so-called family membersof each
patent in the clean set as obtained through the screening in step 3. Patents are
family members if they are based upon the same priority document(s), which means
that these are patents that comprise exactly the same claim. This information is
particularly relevant because of our focus on international technology di¤usion. In
the nal step 5, we checked the overall set for a language bias. That is, in evaluating
the patent abstracts we sometimes encountered patents that were described in a
national language, for instance in French or German. We now discuss each step in
more detail.
Step 1: Conning the base set by general keywords
We rst constructed a base set by using general keywords. Since the focal point
of our analysis is sulfur abatement technologies, the search in EPOs database was
rst restricted to the use of the following combination of keywords: SO2 or SOx or
+SULFUR+ or +SULPHUR+. A +put in front of or after a keyword guarantees
31http://www.espacenet.com/
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that the search engine yields patents that also contain these original words. For
example, +sulfur+ also yields patents that include the word desulfurization.
The result is a base set that identies all those patents related to sulfur. At the
date of the rst search (26 September 2003), the generated base set contained a
total number of 121,913 patents.
Step 2: Restricting the base set by technology-specic keywords
As the next step, we further restricted the patent set to SO2 abatement technology
categories. One well-known technique with a long history in SO2 reduction is scrub-
bing, which is typically an of end-of-pipe technology. This category is representative
for much of the technologies patented in the 1970s and 1980s. However, scrubbing
is not the only technique to deal with SO2 emissions. Given the range of technical
options, we followed the technological distinctions that are included in the RAINS
model, developed at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (see
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/). The RAINS model classies the following SO2 abatement
categories (Cofala and Syri, 1998):
1. The use of low-sulfur fuels, including fuel desulfurization;
2. In-furnace control of SO2 emissions (e.g., through limestone injection or with
several types of uidized bed combustion);
3. Conventional wet ue gas desulfurization processes;
4. Advanced, high e¢ ciency methods for capturing sulfur from ue gas;
5. Measures to control process emissions.
We used this subclassication to dene new keywords for subsearches within our
initial set of patents. In particular, we used the group-related keywords represented
in Table A2. The rst subsearch was based on the use of low-sulfur fuels, including
fuel desulfurization. The keywords applied for this class are: FUEL, DESULP and
DESULF. Subsearch 2 focused on in-furnace control of SO2 emissions by imposing
the keywords COMBUST, BURN, INCINER, LIME, LIMESTONE, CA and CAL-
CIUM. In subsearch 3 we combined classes 3 and 4 of the RAINS classication by
simultaneously employing the keywords FLUE and GAS. Note that category 5, with
measures to control process emissions, may comprise various techniques. Therefore,
we did not specify this class in detail but used expert opinion from the Eindhoven
University of Technology, The Netherlands, on relevant characteristics of the newest
technologies instead. In this respect, oxidative desulfurization was recognized as a
relatively new process to cut back SO2 emissions. We included oxidative desul-
furizationby using the keywords OXIDATIVE and DESUL in subsearch 4. The
subsearches of step 2 reduced the set of potentially relevant patents to 4,243.
Step 3: Individual patent screening
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Table A.2: Keywords (in caps) in subsearches
Subsearch Keywords
1 FUEL and DESULF+ or DESULP+
2 COMBUST or BURN+ or INCINER+
and LIME or LIMESTONE or CA or CALCIUM
3 FLUE and GAS
4 OXIDATIVE+ and DESUL+
The four subsearches outlined above led to a pool of potentially relevant patents.
In step 3 all these 4,243 patents were individually screened in order to assess the
explicit relationship to SO2 abatement. If no relationship was found, the patent was
removed from the set. It remained in the set otherwise. The total number of rejected
patents, including double counts, was 1,741 (41%). Thus, the adjusted patent yield
was 2,502.
Step 4: Retrieval of patent families
The nal step in the data acquisition procedure required the identication and
retrieval of the mother patents and their family members using the clean set of
2,502 patents as obtained in the previous step. Information on the ling procedure
is required for labeling a patent as a mother patent or as family member.
The patent o¢ ce at which a patent is led assigns an application number and an
application date (ling date) to the patent. The application number is unique for
each patent led. The inventor must request a novelty search, which is conducted
by experts at the patent o¢ ce. During this search process the experts examine
the national patent database and go through international literature to identify the
current state of the specic technology (i.e. previous claims that have been made
and patents that have been led).32 The ndings are summarized in a report, after
which the inventor may rewrite the application within a given time frame. Essential
is that on the basis of the novelty search, the actual novelty of the claim made by
the inventor is identied. The novelty of the claim is therefore intrinsically linked to
the application number. If the technology uses existing knowledge from other patent
applications or publications, as identied by the novelty search, these are registered
in the patent through patent citations.
Once an inventor les its patent application for the rst time (the application
date) in a certain country, it has a maximum of one year to also le the same appli-
cation in other countries. This is the so-called priority year. Important is that the
application date in the country of rst ling serves as the reference date (priority
date) for the novelty search in the additional countries. Only technological develop-
ments prior to this date are considered while examining the patent application. In
order to make use of this priority right, the inventor needs to add the application
number of the initial ling to the list of priority documents (or numbers). This list
contains references to previous patent applications done by the inventor over the
32For European and international patents a global search in patent databases is required.
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same technology. By linking the current application to previous patent applications
the list of priority documents provides information on how the technology devel-
oped over time and space. If the protected technology is completely new the list of
priority numbers only contains the application number.33
Formally, we have identied the mother patent as the patent for which the ap-
plication number and date are equivalent to the priority number and date. Since
the ling of a family member is a request for protection of the technology in an-
other country, it also receives a unique application number and application date in
that country. The protected technology, however, is exactly the same as the mother
patent. Therefore the same list of priority numbers is assigned to the family mem-
ber as to the mother patent. Family members can thus be dened as patents that
have exactly the same priority number(s) as the mother patent, but which are led
in another country and therefore have a di¤erent application number. Hereby we
follow the denition of the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO).
The priority and application numbers of the 2,502 clean patents served as the
basis to identify the mother and family patents. Using the priority numbers, a
search in EPOs online database esp@cenet identied 2,271 mother patents led
between 1970 and 2000. As explained above, multiple patents can be found by
entering a priority number due to the existence of family patents and technological
improvements over time. If additional priority numbers were encountered during this
search process, they were added to the search procedure. To maintain the cleanness
of the database all patents were again tested on relevance by screening the patent
text based on the keywords mentioned in Table A.2.
Step 4a: European patents and World patents
European patents (EP) and international patents (WO) are special patents, because
each such patent grants protection in multiple countries. The inventor can opt to
le a European or international patent application in one patent o¢ ce instead of
ling several patents at the national o¢ ces of those countries. The inventor can
choose in which participating countries of the patent treaties (European Patent
Convention or the Patent Cooperation Treaty) patent protection is requested. If
during our search a European or international patent was encountered, the countries
in which protection was requested were registered using the o¢ cial document (in
pdf-format). If the new technology was directly led as a European or international
patent, the priority document(s) therefore include the EP#### or WO####
reference. The mother country was identied by means of this o¢ cial document
in which the ling o¢ ce was mentioned. If the ling o¢ ce was lacking, the mother
patent was assigned to the country of origin of the inventor. The countries mentioned
in the document, excluding the mother country, were identied as countries holding
a family member. If the new technology was rst led at a national patent o¢ ce
33Note that the list of priority numbers is di¤erent from a patent citing, which refers to a
previously led patent from which (some of) the essentials are used in a new, but potentially
di¤erent, type of technology. Hence the former refers to the development of a single technology,
while the latter refers to knowledge spillovers in general.
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and then internationally protected by means of European and international patents,
the mother patents were assigned to a country on the basis of the priority number,
i.e., DE#### belonged to Germany, U.S.#### to the U.S., etcetera. During the
1970-1997 period, 287 EPs and 97 WOs were led respectively.
Example In the following case the European patent serves both as mother patent
and as family member.
 Priority #: EP19970114906 - priority date: 28 August 1997
 Mother patent: EP0899001 - led by a German inventor at the European
Patent O¢ ce. Therefore it is assigned to Germany.
Besides the national family members in the U.S., Japan and Canada, the original
document shows that additional protection is requested in Austria, Switzerland,
Denmark, Finland, France, UK, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Sweden and more
European countries. In the next case the European patent serves only as family
member.
 Priority #: DE19782839541 - priority date: 12 September 1978
 Mother patent: DE2839541 - Germany
 European patent: EP0008770 - led on 29 August 1979, entails Belgium,
Switzerland, France, UK, Luxemburg, Netherlands and Sweden as a family
member.
If the mother country is also included in the pdf it is not registered to prevent double
counting. Other family members are JP55039298 and DK150704.
For certain European and international patents the family members showed an
overlap for the countries in which the technology was protected with patents led at
national o¢ ces. For instance, if an EP patent was part of the WO patent or the EP
patent had a national equivalent. To prevent double counting we have ranked the
family members in the order from national to international patent. Thus if there
was already a national family member it was not registered anymore as part of the
EP and/or WO patent. The countries protected by the EP patent were not listed
anymore as part of the WO patent.
Once a WO patent is led all nationally registered family members receive the
application number (WO####) of the international patent as additional priority
number. Due to the strict denition of patent families these family members should
be treated as members of a di¤erent (new) family for which no mother patent exists,
as illustrated by the following example.
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Example
 Priority #: DE19971053191 - priority date: 21 November 1997
 Mother patent: DE19753191 - Germany
 Family members: PL340564, WO9926713, EP1039964 and AU751684B
The Australian patent (AU751684B) is discarded because is does not belong to the
countries researched. All three other family members are led on 18 November
1997. For the Polish (PL340564) and EP patent (EP1039964) one can see the added
WO1998EP07368 in the priority number row. In addition, this example illustrates
the issue of double counting. By looking at the original document of the international
patent, we can see that it o¤ers protection in multiple countries. One of these
countries is Poland, which is already registered by the national patent. Furthermore,
a reference is made to the EP patent, which was also already registered. To prevent
double counting we have not registered these patents again as family members. For
this particular WO patent it turned out, that it did not provide us with additional
family members within our group of countries.
A nal remark on the registration of patent family members concerns the reg-
istration of Canadian patents. The online database esp@cenet had some trouble in
retrieving the priority and ling documents of Canadian patents and represented
them as CAD000000.34 To obtain the correct information for these patents, we have
used the database of the Canadian Intellectual Property O¢ ce and the information
from family members. By searching for the specic patent numbers, which were
correctly reported in esp@cenet, the required information was obtained.
Step 5: Testing for language bias
In evaluating the individual patent abstracts we sometimes encountered patents
(title and/or abstract) that were described in a national language, for instance in
French or in German. In most cases an English abstract was available as well, but
not for all. This brought up the issue of a potential language bias in our database. In
order to check for this language bias, and to identify the relevance of these patents,
we translated the keywords. Table A.2 contains the used keywords in the respective
languages.
Within esp@cenet it is possible to search within a limited number of national
databases and within the worldwide database. The worldwide database includes
patents from over 70 countries and regions and also covers the publications from the
national databases. Within the national databases one can search using national
languages, while in the worldwide database only the English language is allowed. To
retrieve patents written in a national language from the worldwide database English
keywords are su¢ cient according to the esp@cenet help le. Although titles are
indexed with English keywords, there still may be some patents that have abstracts
written in another language, such as German.
34See http://v3.espacenet.com/textdoc?DB=EPODOC&IDX=CA1022728&F=0&QPN=CA1022728
for an example.
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Table A.3: Keywords in di¤erent languages
English German French Dutch
SO2 SO2 SO2 SO2
SOx SOx SOx SOx
Sulfur/sulphur Schwefel Soufre Zwavel
Fuel Brennsto¤, brandsto¤, benzin Combustible Brandstof
Combust (ver)brennbar Combustible Brandbaar
Lime Kalk Platre, Mortier Kalk/calcium
Gas Vergasen Gaz, gazier Vergassen
Oxidation Oxydation Oxydation Oxidatie
Flue Schornstein, Abzurgsrohr Carneau Schoorsteen, rookkanaal
Desulfurization Entschwefelung Ontzwaveling
To test for a language bias, we used di¤erent translations of the word sulfur.
Using the German translation of sulfur into the worldwide database provides zero
hits. The Dutch translation also generates zero hits, since the patents led in the
national database can be retrieved in the worldwide database having English titles
and/or abstracts. Only one French patent from 1903 was found by using soufreas
a keyword. However, 54 Canadian patents were retrieved by this search of which 24
also have English abstracts and family members. None of them passed the selection
criteria described in step 2. Out of the 54 Canadian patents 12 were led outside of
the period covered by this research. For the remaining 18 patents esp@cenet did not
provide the priority number and date (see step 4; CAD000000). As a nal remark
regarding the testing of the language bias, note that the power of the search engine
used by esp@cenet is smaller than the one used by the patent experts of EPO. For
instance, it does not allow for subsearches as described in step 2.
Help-les on the sites of the Canadian Intellectual Property O¢ ce and esp@cenet
make clear that for most Canadian patents granted before 15 August 1978 abstracts
and claims were unavailable.35 For this reason priority dates and numbers cannot
be retrieved in the esp@cenet database and we might have missed several patents
led in French. The 18 remaining patents were all granted between 1970 and 1978
and were led only in French. Language barriers and the absense of an abstract
prevent a full screening of those patents and we therefore exclude them from the
database. Despite this potential language bias we decided to maintain the other
Canadian observations for this period within our database. First, the Canadian
family members from this period were detected by our described search process in
35The text of the abstracts and claims is not available for patents that were granted prior
to August 15, 1978. These patents can only be searched by their patent number, titles, owner
or inventor names, or classication. Canadian patent applications can be led in either Eng-
lish or French. All patent documents on this site have both English and French titles. How-
ever, between 1960 and 1978, titles are available only in the language used at the time of ling.
http://patents1.ic.gc.ca/content-e.html. Abstracts where published systematically from 1978 on-
wards, although there are some earlier Abstracts, if provided by the applicant, mostly in English.
http://patentinfo.european-patent-o¢ ce.org/_resources/data/pdf/canada.pdf
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esp@cenet. Second, the fact that the referred period falls outside of the inuence of
the protocols, the limited share of Canada in the number of patent lings and the
small language bias for other countries provide enough condence in the quality of
our database.
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Appendix C Data sources and denitions of vari-
ables
 MOTHER AND FAMILY PATENTS: See Appendix B for a detailed expla-
nation of our counts, including the distinction between EP/WO and national
counts. Source: European Patent O¢ ce in The Hague, The Netherlands
 COAL SHARE : Dened as total production of electricity generated from coal
inputs relative to total electricity produced. Source: Energy Balances, Statis-
tical Compendium, ed. 01, CD-ROM, Paris: OECD.
 TOTAL PATENTS: Overall number of claimed patents for all types of tech-
nologies led in each country, i.e., all mother patents that have been claimed
in at least one other country (so having at least one family member). Source:
OECD
 RESEARCH : Gross Domestic Expenditures on R&D as a percentage of GDP.
For explanation of R&D epxenditures see http://www.uis.unesco.org/ev.php?ID=5127_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC.
Source: Main Science and Technology Indicators OECD
 EVENT DUMMY Own construction with dummy equal to 1 if country is
signatory country of a specic protocol. See table 3 in main text.
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